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ABSTRACT
V
Language is a theme which has always puzzled scholars and poets due to its 
complexity and its implications in human relationshiops. The belief on the effective 
communication of the words, though» is not unanimous. Especially when areas of 
knowledge other than the humanities start to retreat from the realm of verbal 
communication and create their own code, language loses its aura and power of 
conveyer of truth This dissertation is an attempt to analyse some of Emily Dickinson’s 
poems on language and its impact on human lives. In Aiese poems, the poet hi^ili^ts 
the paradox power/inefficiency of flie words, as well as flie si^ficance of silence 
confronted the void of language.
In the introductory diapter, I present my reading on some criticism of 
Dickinson's poetry. Mudi of this criticism oriented my analysis of the poems 
contributing largely to my understanding of them. In the next chapter, I discuss some 
theoretical texts on language by Saussure. Wittgenstein and Geoi^e Steiner. The 
analysis of the poems itself is in the third chapter, whidi is foUowed by the conclusion 
of the dissertation as a whole. In general, I tried to read her poems closely, keeping 
track of her paradoxical views on language, as somefliing that "fails, but entertains...*'
RESUMO
VI
Devido st sua complesidâde e às suas tremendas implicações nas relações 
humanas, a linguagem sempre apresentou-se como um tema bastante intrigante para 
os poéticos e teóricos. Não há unanimidade, porém, quanto à sua eficiência na 
comunicação. Isso faz-se notar de forma particularmente clara quando as chamadas 
ciências exatas abandonam a comunicação verbal e saem em busca de um código 
próprio. A linguagem perde, então, o seu status do veículo da verdade. Esta dissertação 
é uma tentativa de análise de alguns poemas de Emily Dickinson sobre a linguagem e 
sua importância na vida humana. Nestes poemas, a poeta joga com o paradoxo 
forçca/ineficiência das palavras, bem como a si^fícação do sUêncio comparado com o 
vaiáo presmte na linguagem.
No capítulo introdutório, eu apresento alguns críticos da poesia de Emity 
Dicldnson. Grande paríe desta crítica contribui muito para a análise e a compreensão 
dos poemas. No próximo capítulo, eu faço uma breve leitura de alguns textos teóricos 
de Saussure, Witígenstein e George Steiner sobre a linguagem. O terceiro capítulo 
contém a análise dos poemas, o que é seguido pela conclusão da dissertação como um 
todo. De modo geral, eu tento ler os poemas detalhadamente, trilhando as idéias 






CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION............................................................. .... 1
CHAPTER n  : ON LANGUAGE.................... ...............................................21
CHAPTER m  : DICKINSON’S METALANGUAGE POEMS................ ..45




Emily  D ic k in so n  pub l ished  scarcely dur ing  her l i f e t i m e J  
Charles Anderson  once said tha t  she wrote "cut o ff  from communion 
with any but  p o s t e r i t y - A s  a m at ter  of fact she even tr ied to keep 
some contact  w i th  the l i te ra ry  world through Thomas Higginson ,  and 
they wrote one ano the r  for some time. She ended up sending him some 
of  her poems,  but  the recep t ion  is well known. For H igginson ,  who 
may cer ta in ly  s tand  for the readers  at that  time, her style needed 
"correct ions."  T hough  the o r ig ina l i ty  and newness  of her poetry;  
caught  him on the spot , he did not see her  work as poetry;  he ra ther  
descr ibed it as "beau t i fu l  though ts  and words,"  and t r ied  to s teer  her 
towards a more conven t iona l  poetry .^  Perhaps  frus t ra ted  w i th  this  f i rs t  
contact ,  she never  t r ied  to make her  poetry public  again. After  her
death in 1886, her s is te r  found her m anuscr ip ts  in one of her drawers ,  
and family and fr iends pub l ished  some se lec ted  poems.^ Her early 
ed i to rs  even t r ied  to "make the meter  scan and the l ines rhyme."-
It was only in 1955 that  Thomas H. Johnson pub l ished  her 
complete  poems and le t ters .  Johnson 's  work is extremely im por tan t  not 
only because  o f  the  comple teness  of his p ub l ica t ions ,  but a lso  due to 
his  carefu l  ed i t ing ,  which  included a l is t  o f  m anuscr ip t  va r ian ts ,  
p rev ious  p u b l ica t ion  da ta ,  and emendat ions  o f  ear l ie r  ed i to rs .^
As soon as D ick inson 's  poetry was revealed ,  the  or ig ina l i ty  
and s t ran gen ess  of  her  style were im m edia te ly  noticed.  Accord ing  to 
C har les  A nderson ,  "she used words as i f  she were the  f i rs t  to do so, 
w i th  a joy  and an awe largely  lost to E ng l i sh  poetry since the 
R e n a i s s a n c e . " *7  She chose the  hymn meter  as a pa t te rn ,  wh ich  had  not 
been  done by any o ther  wri te r  previously .  Also ,  she used assonance ,  
consonance ,  iden t ica l  and suspended rhym es ,  tha t  had not been 
explored  in or thodox  E n g l i sh  before, as the  m ain  pa t te rn  of  rhym ing .^  
For  David  Por te r ,  D ick inson 's  newness lay in the fact hat  she was not  
concerned  w i th  the " reve la t ion  of a large and fam il ia r  t ru th  but with  
the  re lease  o f  a small  d isconcer t ing  mystery  r e d i s c o v e r e d . I n  fact,  
her  poetry  has the^ faagm entary  charac te r i s t ic  which  w ^ l d  be la ter  
explored  by the  m odern is t s .  And she is even c ited  as a fo rerunner  of
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modern poetry for us ing  devices such as e tymology, which sends the 
readers  back to root m e a n in g s .  ^^ F in a l ly , some of her ideas on the 
na ture  ofz the  poet,  h is  tasks  and power,  are "animated by a s t rength  
of  feel ing and m anner  of a r t icu la t io n  w ithout  precedent  in our 
l i te ra ture ."  ^ 1
Accord ing  to James W oodress ,  c r i t ic i sm  of  D ick inson 's  work 
can be d iv ided  into  the period  before and the period after  the  
p ub l ica t io n  o f  Johnson 's  va r io rum  ed it ions .  Before the p u b l ica t ion  o f  
Johnson 's  work,  some im por tan t  a r t ic les  were p ub l ished  on Emily 
D ick inson 's  poetry ,  such as those  by Conrad  A iken  and A l len  Tate,  but  
there  was a lso  m uch  specu la t ion  on the p o e t ’s li fe , which  did l i t t le  for 
the  com prehens ion  o f  the  am pl i tude  of  her  work. After  Johnson 's  
ed i t ions ,  however,  D ick inson 's  work could be largely  rev iew ed ,  and 
comprehensive  s tudies  on her poetry came a b o u t .  ^2
W ith in  this  large scope of  c r i t ic i sm  on D ick inson 's  work ,  we 
have many choices on ar t ic les  and books by ou ts tan d in g  c r i t ic s .  Some 
of  them can be considered  qui te  im por tan t  in th a t  they helped e s tab l i sh  
Dick inson 's  repu ta t ion .  The aforem ent ioned  Conrad  Aiken  and A l len  
Tate are  some o f  these  examples.  In the i r  a r t ic le s ,  equal ly  named after  
"Emily D ick inson ,"  they work  w ith  p u r i ta n ism ,  re l ig ion  and dea th  in
her poetry ,  t rea t ing  their  themes by resor t ing  to her b iography 
frequently.
Ivor W inter  is one of  the early cri t ics  of D ick inson  as well.  
In "Emily D ick inson  and the Limits  of Judgement ,"  makes a negat ive  
c r i t ic i sm  of  her poems,  a rgu ing  that  she was p ra ised  for her worst  
m is takes  and s ta t ing  th a t  her  w r i t ing  was "unpardonable"  due to its 
obscur i ty .  He analyses  some poems and, f inal ly ,  in spi te  o f  some 
re s t r i c t io n s ,  he recognizes  th a t  "The las t  n igh t  she lived" is great  
poetry.
S t i l l  w i th in  the ca tegory  of im portan t  early  c r i t ics ,  D onald  E. 
Thackrey  and C har les  A nderson  should be mentioned.  Thackrey ,  in 
"The com m unica t ion  o f  the  Words,"  works w ith  Emily D ick inson 's  
a t t i tude  tow ards  language  and words ,  and d iscusses  her m ethod  o f  
com pos i t ion ,  as wel l  as the  power of  the  ind iv idua l  words  in  her  
poems. He analyses  poems whose  centra l  theme is lan gu ag e  and 
explores  the  paradox p o w er /  ineff ic iency  of  language,  and a lso  her  
w orsh ip fu l  ideas towards  s i lence .  A nderson 's  book, Emily D ick in son 's  
Poetry:  S ta irw ay  of  Surpr ise ,  was a lso quite  im por tan t ,  as it was "the 
f i rs t  com prehens ive  r ead in g  of  all  poems based  on Johnson 's  tex t ."^^  
The c r i t ic  is concerned only  w i th  poetry as Art  and  explores  d i f fe ren t  
them es on. her  poetry: "The p a ra d ise  o f  Art ,"  "The outer  world ,"  "The
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inner world," and "The other paradise." Like Thackrey, Anderson deals 
with metalanguage and metapoetry, and lays emphasis on D ickinson's  
concern with expression.
After the establishment o f  D ickinson's work as part o f  the 
American culture and literature, a great number o f  academic criticism  
on her poetry and letters was published. We w il l  deal here with some 
examples o f this criticism  on poetry only, and it is quite important to 
notice the variety o f  themes and approaches explored and view ed by 
the authors in general.
Roy Harvey Pearce, in The Continuity of American Poetrv, 
examines the theme o f  "achievement o f  status through crucial 
experiences." For him, this achievem ent, or the attempt to achieve  
psychological status through experiences o f  love, marriage, death, 
faith, and poetic expression, pervades a ll  the poet's works and is her 
central concern. Hyatt H. Waggoner, on the other hand, in American  
Poets: From the Puritans to the Present, works specifica lly  w ith the 
theme o f  re lig ion , considering D ickinson's v iew  not only from a 
puritan perspective, but through a transcendental one, and states that 
the poet redefines faith in a more universal manner.
Touching the theme o f  death, we have Dolores D. Lucas's 
Emily D ickinson and R idd le . Death, according to the critic, is the
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poet's major concern and presents an actual 'riddle' in her poetry. She 
analyses D ickinson's experiment of the riddle, trying to examine her 
idea o f  death, and, consequently, o f  life  and truth.
More recently, fem inist critics have also contributed to the 
critic ism  on D ickinson's work. Among many prominent authors, one 
relevant example is Sandra Gilbert and Susan Oubar in The Madwoman  
in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary 
Im agination . In this study, the critics place Emily D ickinson among a 
number o f  women writers from the nineteenth-century. D ealing  with  
the theme o f  enclosure and escape in Dickinson's work, they explore  
"metaphors o f  physical discomfort manifested by frozen landscapes  
and fiery interiors."'^ D ickinson's work is said to fo llow  the pattern 
o f  a fem ale literary tradition, and she herself is seen to embody the 
character o f  the "madwoman" o f  many women writers's stories. V ivian  
Poliak, in "Thirst and Starvation in Emily Dickinson's Poetry." and 
Margaret D ick ie , in "Dickinson's Discontinuous Lyric S e l f ,” present 
studies in w hich they bring about different themes: Poliak links thirst 
and starvation to renunciation: "lack o f  appetite" for human 
relationships. Food and drink imagery is also examined. D ickie  
illum inates the discontinuity o f  the "lyric-self" in contrast to the 
traditional m ale 'plot.'
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In "The Maiden and the Muse: D ick inson’s Tropes of Poetic  
Creation," Rita Di Giuseppe brings up the paradoxical theme of poet 
vs. poetry, considering Dickinson's struggle for creative autonomy and 
for avoiding the bias o f being a woman writer. The creative power o f  
the poet is compared to that o f  Ood.
Emily D ickinson's poetry is , then, a very rich universe to be 
explored. In this dissertation, however, I w ill  be specifica lly  
concerned with some poems whose central theme is language and its 
im plication. Surveying her poetry as a w hole , I came across many 
poems about language and communication, as is  the case o f  poem J. 
1651:
A Word made Flesh is seldom  
And tremblingly partook 
Nor then perhaps reported 
But have I not mistook  
Each o f  us has tasted 
With ecstasies o f  stealth  
,,The very food debated 
To our specific  strength —
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A Word that breathes d istinctly  
Has not the power to die 
Cohesive as the Spirit 
It may expire i f  He —
"Made Flesh and dwelt among us"
Could condescension be 
Like this consent o f  Language 
This loved Philology
Indeed, as Charles Anderson su ggests , the poet is "concerned 
w ith  expression from her earliest years." And in many o f her poems, 
l ike in the poem above, D ickinson sees the word as a powerful entity  
w hich has its own life  and fu lf i l ls  an emptiness in human life (This 
and other aspects in her poetry w ill  be explored with more details in 
chapter III.)
Some critics have dealt directly with language as a thème in 
D ickinson's poetry. John Gross, for example, in "'Tell All the Truth 
But — refers to D ickinson's 'noncommunication,' that is ,  the 
u n w illingn ess to communicate. For him, the poet feared the 
"uncertainty o f  an understanding reason," which would prevent the 
reader from getting what she means. He compares Dickinson to several
8
other nineteenth-century artiats who experienced the same fear for the 
'communication o f  the word.' According to Gross, authors such as 
Emerson, M elv ille , Hawthorne, and Thoreau shared with Dickinson an 
'obliquity' o f method, which allowed them to 'tell the truth ' slantly, as 
i f  d isguised  by the fear of being attacked by an audience which was  
not contemporary enough to understand them. Even in her prose, 
D ickinson was indirect and, at tim es, she made no differentiation  
between prose and poetry.
In " Emily D ickinson, Emerson, and the Poet as Namer," John 
S. Mann comparés D ickinson to Emerson in that both were concerned  
with the process o f naming things. The poet as 'namer' is the one who  
sees and feels nature sensitive ly  enough to create the names for its 
elem ents. For Mann, though, D ickinson's attitude differs from  
Emerson's, for she is conscious o f  the doubleness o f things and o f  the  
loss  and absence which ex ists  is between a thing and its name. He 
highlights Dickinson's seduction for names, their power and 
im plications. Naming for the poet presents something o f  an 'adamic' 
quality, in that it is a way o f  recreating what he sees , what he knows. 
In this sense, Dickinson's poet is the namer and the creator o f  the 
world, that is ,  the poet "possess[es] the world by naming it," what is 
evidenced in her poetry in the complex question o f  the
9
nam ing/possesaion dilemma. Its complexity ranges from the naming 
and defining o f herself —  her inner action and emotion — to the 
attempt to "define the indefinable," hence, the irony resulting from 
D ickinson's paradoxical poetry.
Many of D ickinson's poems on language are explic itly  
concerned with the ineffic iency o f  language in communicating. In lines  
such as "If I could te ll  how glad I was / I should not be so glad," "I 
can't te ll  you - but you fee l it — "The definition o f  beauty is / That 
defin ition  is none — we can see the poet's attitude towards the 
com m unicability o f language. But even showing the 'failure' o f  
language in defining, te ll in g  th ings, D ickinson recognizes that 
language has much impact on human relationships, and the power and 
independence o f  words are made exp lic it  by the poet in many poems, 
such as J.8:
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There is a word 
Which bears a sword 
Can pierce an armed man
It hurls its barbled sy llables  
And it is mute again —
But where it fell
The saved w ill  tell 
On patriotic day.
Some epauletted Brother 
Gave his breath away.
Wherever runs the breatheless sun —
Wherever roams the day —
There is its n o ise less  onset —
There is its victory!
Behold the keenest marksman!
The most accom plished shot!
Time's sublim est target 
Is a soul "forgot!"
Charles Anderson, in Emily Dickinson's Poetry: Stairway o f  
Surprise, shows that D ickinson is "explicitly concerned with the power 
o f  language."!^ For him, the poet is conscious o f the creative power o f  
words, which is capable o f  "mov[ing] men's hearts." Poetry has its 
own life  and the "living word has re-creative p o w e r . " B y  "living  
word", she means the word that is uttered and used, not the one that 
l ies  inert in a dictionary. The poet, then, believes in this higher power
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o f  words and o f  eloquence itse lf ,  even while  recognizing the ambiguity 
which can surround such a power. Because o f  this be lie f , her language  
i t s e l f  is creative, and she can discover the "inner paradise of art by the 
language o f  s u r p r i s e . " A n d e r s o n  points out D ickinson's "oblique 
approach" as her manner o f  expressing, o f te ll in g  the truth 'slant.' 
W ithin this obliquity, her consc iousness o f  language ineffic iency in 
dealing w ith emotions is apparent. She fears language's dangerous 
am biguity , since , once created, words have their own life  and may 
mean different things, with unexpected consequences.
Another aspect raised by the same critic is Dickinson's  
concern w ith  craftsmanship and with the importance of the poet. The 
poet's craft is viewed as creation o f  beauty not in a heavenly mode, but 
in a theatrical one. D ickinson's poet is extremely human, private and 
devoid o f  divinity.
A lso  em phasizing D ickinson's b e l ie f  in the power o f  words, 
D avid Porter's "The Poetics o f  Doubt" d iscu sses the issu e  o f  the 
affective  power o f poetry in which "impact and innovation are 
concom itant."!^  Pof D ick inson , language caused a shock by the 
"surprise o f  discovery in the familiar is s u e s ,"20 and the poet is the 
one who has "supreme obligations and power" to reveal language's
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surprises. Language assumes a powerful role in the revelation of a 
"large and familiar truth."
Dickinson's attitude towards language seems to be, therefore, 
twofold. She sees in words an powerful and creative power; at the 
same time, she recognizes their ineffic iency in communicating. In his 
article "Sign and Process; The Concept o f  Language in Emerson and 
Dickinson," Roland Hagenbflchle confronts these two aspects. Stating  
the differences between D ickinson's and Emerson's assumptions on the 
nature o f  language, he shows that, for D ickinson, words have some  
kind o f  destructiveness and their power is explosive; the "dangerous 
potential o f  language"21 is explored by the poet through indirection, 
which becomes a strategy o f  "self-defence." Emerson's primacy is laid  
on 'the thing,' w hile  D ickinson privileges 'the word.' HagenbOchle 
builds up a differentiation between the transcendental sign and the 
symbol. The first presents a "subject-object relationship," w hile  the 
second ca lls  on the primacy o f  language, based on an "awareness o f  
the irreducibly l in gu istic  nature o f  all knowledge and, therefore, o f  all  
rea lity ."22 The sign  st i l l  keeps the 'autonomy' of the object; the 
symbol ignores "extralinguistic reality." Dickinson's poetry brings out 
the symbol, and she is aware o f  the lack o f  convention ex is t in g  
between word and reality. M eanwhile, D ickinson is conscious o f  the
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inadequacy o f language. Perception of the thing, for the poet, is not 
exact; conversely, it involves lo ss ,  but even recognizing the 
l im itations o f  language in communicating, she works with it in self-  
negation. Thus, Dickinson's poems "are often records of f a i l u r e . " 2 3
Another critic who examines this double attitude o f the poet 
before language is Murray Arndt in "Emily Dickinson and the Limits 
o f  Language," in which a positive  and a negative attitude towards 
language are examined. While language has " resonances that range 
beyond the lim its o f l o g i c , "24 these same lim its can confine language  
until it "no longer has the power to dominate [Dickinson's] v i s i o n . "25 
Even recognizing the lim its o f  words, she wants to break the lim its o f
)
grammar "push[ing] her poems beyond log ica l lim its o f  l a n g u a g e . "26
Faced, then, with this paradoxical v iew  o f  language, its
power and its ineffic iency, I decided to explore one specific  question
1
concerning language in Emily Dickinson's poetry. If language is 
powerful, but useless in communicating, so why use language? What is 
the function o f  language in human relationships? Here we must 
examine some o f  the criticism  related to the problem.
B. J. Rogers, in "The Truth Told Slant: Emily D ickinson's  
Poetic  Mode," mentions the inability to grasp meaning, posing that 
"meaning does not l ie  in the world o f  external reality, and the senses
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are not to be trusted entirely, although they are all that can be relied  
u p o n . "27 That is , although the perception through which we try to 
express things and fee lings is inaccurate, and the way in which we  
express these same fee lin gs and things is a lso inadequate, there is no 
other way to do it. D ick inson , in a sense, plays with language's  
am biguity producing a circum ferencial movement around a center 
which is omitted. Her poetry moves from the realm o f  'knowable' 
th ings, to the attempt to utter the 'unknowable.' She is , though, quite 
conscious' o f  the im poss ib ility  to present truth and reality  
straightforwardly; som etim es language is even unable to reflect truth.
In Lyric Time. Sharon Cameron states that language "mourns 
th« space it must faithfully  r e c o r d " 2 S ^  and that D ickinson is conscious  
o f  th is  mourning that is language. The experiences which the speaker 
tries to convey are separated from the act o f naming by the 
interpretation o f  that experience, w hich is not the event anymore, but 
the representation o f  it. But even i f  the speaker is conscious o f  this 
failure o f  language, the "necessity for names becomes apparent at 
those moments when they fail u s . "29 Frequently, we do not have words 
for our mental images and. som etim es, "unable to say what we mean, 
we also  fail to know it."^® D ickinson , in  Cameron's v iew , has a 
unique attitude in relation to the complex and d ia lectica l relationship
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between presence and representation. D ickinson tries to convey  
presence into language, which acts as a theatrical "source o f  hope." In 
other words, language would be the theater through which what is lost, 
the experience itse lf ,  would be recovered. Would that be the function  
o f language? Would this function, o f recovering the essence o f  
experience, be important to human relationships?
Finally, Jerome Loving, in Emily Dickinson: The Poet on the 
Second Story, is concerned with the "illusions o f language" which is 
our only protection in a w ilderness o f  natural facts." He shows the 
relation la n g u age /i ife /l ie  in D ickinson's poetry. Language can turn life  
into l ie  and, consequently , distant from the "terrible harmony o f  
nature." Would the function o f  language be, then, illusory? Would 
language be the illusory  solution in a cruel natural world?
Having made these considerations, I want to reach a point in 
which I w il l  report my questions to their very source : Emily  
D ickinson's poetry. In other words, my purpose in this dissertation  
w ill  be to analyse som e o f  Dickinson's poems which have language as 
their main theme, trying to come to some conclusion about the function  
o f  language for the poet. I w il l  try to v iew  several aspects in my 
analysis , namely the pow er/inefficiency o f  language, the importance o f  
silence  —  given the noncomm unicability o f  words and the task o f  the
poet as a namer. At the end o f  the analysis , I w ill  try to answer the 
questions I asked before; Why use language? Is it important for our 
relationships?
Many o f  D ickinson's poems give a clue to the answer o f  these  
questions and my hypothesis is that, as a whole, they present language  
as a necessary hope for human life  even though it works in se lf ­
negation.
In the chapter that fo llow s, I w il l  discuss some issues  
concerning language and human communication. In that chapter, I w ill  
discu ss  briefly som e theoretical texts w hich may help illuminate my 
reading o f-D ick inson 's  poetry. Chapter 3 w il l  contain the analysis  o f  
the poems them selves, and chapter 4 w il l  present my conclusions in 
relation to the dissertation as a whole and to my hypothesis.
17
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Language is our vehicle  to talk o f  language itself . The 
defin ition  may seem paradoxical at tim es, and this paradox has been a 
challenge for philosophers, p sych olog is ts , literary critics, linguists ,  
and poets. Language is very complex, and it is through i t se lf  that we  
mention its complexity.
This preoccupation with language, with words, with the poet 
as the language*maker is a strong presence in Dickinson's poetry. And
this se lf-reflectiv ity  o f  language we name metalanguage, that is, 
language about itse lf ,  words on words, as we see on poem J.1261 ■.
A word dropped careless on a page 
May stimulate an eye 
When folded in perpetual seam  
The Wrinkled Maker lie
Infection in the sentence breeds 
We may inhale Despair  
At distances o f  Centuries 
From the Malaria-
The poem above is not only about the word itse lf ,  but about 
the act o f  creation on which writing, language consists . (This poem  
w il l  be d iscussed  in more details on the fo llow ing chapter.)
As pointed out in the former chapter, I here intend to analyse  
Emily D ick inson’s poetry as language and metalanguage. Reading  
about language in Dickinson is reading a poet's viewpoint on 
language, on her own instrument o f  working. But this chapter does not 
aim to analyse her poems on language; its intent is to d iscuss other
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considerations on the topic. In other words, I want to read other 
view points on language, made by other people than the poet.
Language is a topic which has always puzzled scholars. 
Perhaps, Language's se lf-reflexivity  came about when the very first 
'speakers' started communicating through words. That means to say, 
language has always been complex and paradoxical for people, due to 
its unlim ited realm of p oss ib il it ie s ,  and, som etim es, blankness.
In this chapter, I w il l  briefly d iscuss texts by Saussure, 
Ludwig W ittgenstein , and George Steiner. I think it is a necessary step  
before I go on with the analysis o f  Dickinson's work, since it may be 
instrumental for the understanding o f  important aspects on language, 
though this theoretical background w ill  not 'guide' my analysis later 
on, but help creating it. A lso , I think it is important to have different 
view s on the theme, so that we can occasionally  compare them to 
D ickinson's own view s and see how the poet's ideas on it can be 
different or similar to those o f  the scholars.
Before going to the texts them selves, I would like to raise an 
issue  o f  relevance for the work as a whole. In the previous chapter, I 
mentioned the inefficiency o f  language in communicating, in 
expressing fee lings and emotions. Shifting the focus now to the 
theoreticians, we can surely find the same concern with the 'sayable'
2 i
and the 'unsayable.' This is probably the track I w ill follow  in the 
chapter, so that I can achieve a reasonable answer to my first 
questions; for those concerned with whether or not language  
comm unicates, language is sometimes a failure, sometimes su ccessfu l,  
som etimes no better than silence.
The first important concept to be examined is Saussure's  
distinction  between 'signifier' and 'sign ified .' For the linguist, the link 
between the name and the thing it refers to is not physical; it is 
arbitrary and mental. Instead o f  'name' and 'thing,' Saussure uses the 
terms 'sound image' and 'concept.' These two elements are united in a 
psycholog ica l way, and one recalls the other. The sound image is the 
'signifier,' w hich has a material quality, as opposed to the concept, 
which is the 's ign ified .' The two o f  them make up the sign. The sign  
has an arbitrary nature, for it results from an arbitrary association;  
that is ,  the s ign if ier  "actually has no natural connection with the 
sign ified ."!
In Reading Saussure. R. Harris d iscu sses  Saussure's Cours 
de Linguistiqu^. presenting the lingu istic  s ign  as being constituted by 
mental elements rather than by physical ones. The sign is the 
combination o f  s ign ifier  and sign ified , but it is ordinarily viewed as 
the sound image itse lf .  According to Haris, then, Saussure's merits lie
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in d istinguish ing between "The 'sound' o f a word in the sense of its 
image a c o u s t iq u i  and the 'sound' o f  the associated acoustic  
phenomena. "2
Thus, the difference between the sound image and its 
associated  acoustic  phenomena relates to the linguistic  sign being 
"construed simply as a mental combination o f  a certain sound pattern 
with a certain m e a n i n g .C o n s e q u e n t l y  the internal relationship  
between sign ifier  and signified is arbitrary. This is an important 
principle o f  l in gu ist ic s  as elucidated by Saussure. Arbitrariness o f  
language however, has nothing to do with individual choice, but with  
language being a soc ia l institution which goes beyond all others and 
has a unique character:
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. . . la  langue,  claim s Saussure, is arbitrary in a unique way. 
The absence both of external and internal constraints on the 
pairing s ign if ian ts  with particular s ign if iés  means that for 
any g iven  language the choice o f  actual s igns( e .g. soeur  ) 
from among the range o f  possib le  s igns( zoeur, soeuf, 
p a ta p lu . . . )  is entirely unconstrained. This absolute freedom  
to vary 'arbitrarily' is the fundamental reason Saussure w ill  
adduce for the remarkable diversity o f human languages and 
the no le ss  remarkable susceptib ility  o f  languages to quite 
revolutionary structural changes. Other social institutions are 
not free to vary in this way because changes in their case  
(econom ic, lega l, politica l, etc.) have immediate material 
consequences for the members o f  society. Thus although la
langue  is a socia l institution • and in certain aspects the very 
archetype of a social institution - its arbitrariness gives it a 
structural autonomy vis d vis society  which would be 
unthinkable (and incomprehensible) in the case of any other 
established socia l institution .4
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Saussure show s, therefore, that language is an arbitrary 
entity which ex ists  "only through the associating  o f  the sign ifier with  
the s ig n if ie d ."5 This process o f  association is how we 'name.' Naming  
is m ental and arbitrary. Understanding is possib le  because there is a 
shared value which is attributed to a sign. But since language is an 
abstraction, the identity and the values o f  words can be confused. 
Identity can be v iew ed as the word itse lf , but the value o f  a word is 
not w ithin  the word itse lf . It has to do with what the word brings to 
mind, the realm o f  diversity that the word invokes through 
psycholog ica l flashes and associations.
In short, language is a complex system  made up by the 
opposition  o f  concrete unions. The signified and the signifier compose  
the sign . The sign , then, is the arbitrary name. Thus, language is an 
attempt towards representing the world, representing elements which  
lie  outside the word. Saussure sees it as "the most complex and 
universal o f  a ll system s of expression."^ And yet, this system o f  
representation is arbitrary and pervaded by ambiguity.
We have briefly examined the way a linguist v iew s language. 
In l in g u ist ic s ,  language is the object o f  study, an articulated form of  
expressing m essages. It is seen from a material perspective, taking  
into account its parts and characteristics. It is an 'object.' How would  
a philosopher v iew  language? First o f a ll, we must have in mind that 
philosophy studies reality as a whole, trying to apprehend the most o f  
it in  order to understand it better. Language is one part o f  reality, one 
o f  the most important, we must say, but it is not reality itse lf .  
Linguistica works with language through a m etalinguistic  discourse, 
whereas philosophy does it through a paralinguistic  one. That is to  
say. L inguistics uses language to go after itse lf . It is language trying  
to see how itse lf  represents the world. It is language as se lf-reflection . 
Philosophy uses language not to go after language itse lf ,  but to go 
beyond it and to apprehend the world, even though, as we w ill  see  
next, language's representation o f the world is limited.
Language is important to human life  in that it directly affects  
human relationships, and it is definitely responsible for the moving o f  
society . Ideologies , advertisements, disagreem ents, even wars are 
conveyed through language and, not rarely, because o f  it. 
Comprehending life , therefore, has to do with comprehending  
language, especia lly  because it is through language that we try to
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express what we see o f  the world. Consequently, what comes to mind 
is the question o f  representation. If language is our principal means to 
convey and represent reality, then our representation o f  it is not 
'reliable.' Ludwig W ittgenstein, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,  
states: "What finds its reflection in language, la:nguage can not 
represent .”  ^ Language is viewed as a mirror, as an image o f  
something e lse ,  and here we must recall Saussure’s statement o f  the 
word being the s ign  for something which is elsewhere. The 
representation o f  this 'else' is distant from it. Reality is distant from 
the proposition o f  itse lf .
W ittgenstein discusses the difference between naming and 
describing. The latter is a possib le  operation; the same can not be said  
about the former. Describing im plies taking into account 'how' 
something is; naming, 'what' it is. In describ ing, we must point out 
characteristics w hich are present in the thing described, that is ,  we are 
sending the meaning towards other words that, in turn, try to compose  
the sign ificant whole. Naming is definitely  more complex, since saying  
what something 'is* means giving it a name, that represents it. This 
name is the arbitrary sign stated by Saussure. As significant examples, 
some passages o f  the Tractatus are worth mentioning here;
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The sign  through which we express the 
thought I call the prepositional sign. And 
the proposition is the propositional sign in 
its projective relation to the world.®
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Here the philosopher states the idea of language as 
representation. First, there is the thought, the mental concept, as put 
by Saussure, which is expressed by the sign. The sign, the "projective 
relation to the world," is the representation of the world. This is how  
we express our thoughts. Then, we have the acknowledgement o f  the 
l im itations o f  such a representation;
Objects I can only name.  Signs represent 
them. I can only speak o f  them. I cannot 
a s s e r t  them. A proposition can only say how 
a thing is , not what  it is. ^
The gap between reality and the representation o f  it becomes 
clearer, in that the assertion o f it is im possib le, given the fact that the 
'What', the essence, can not be uttered. The 'what' lies outside  
language. We can 'name' things - that is the process explained by 
Saussure, the sign naming things through an arbitrary association o f  
sign ified  and sign ifier  - but we can not 'assert' them .
A clearer  s ta tem en t  of  the gap  rep re se n ta t io n /  rea l i ty  can be 
found in the fo l low ing  passage  by W it tgens te in :
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Propositions can represent the whole  
reality, but they cannot represent what they 
must have in common with reality ...
That w hich mirrors i t se lf  in language,  
language cannot represent. That which  
expresses i t s e l f  in language, we cannot
express by language.
The philosopher, thus, gradually moves from the perspective that 
language is the representation o f  the world, to the fact that there is an 
absolute gap between this representation and the world itse lf .  
Language is only a mirror for what it reflects. If we take this gap into  
account, the question about the existence o f  real communication  
arises. We must som ewhat digress in order to make clear what is 
understood by communication.
Com munication, in its primary sense, involves basically  two  
or more elements and something to be said; receptor, sender, and 
m essage. A wish to understand and to be understood is also required, 
wherein comes the need o f a shared knowledge; in other words, the 
two elements in the process must have a similar experience concerning  
what is being said. The problem lies in this sim ilarity o f  experience.
How can we measure experience? If experience is something one 
acquires when one lives it, it is a private phenomenon. If each o f  us 
has her/his own experience, that is , i f  the outside world causes  
different im pressions on each person, experience is unique. Perhaps it 
ifl about the uniqueness o f  private experience that W ittgenstein writes 
when he mentions the 'unsayable.' M ystic experience is private and can 
not be always uttered. On that, wrote Werner Leinfellner:
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It seems that W ittgenstein , under the 
influence Schopenhauer's role o f  
contem plation in Art, fo llow s here his early 
master : There are, according to him, things  
that can not be put into words. But they 
make them selves manifest. They are what is 
m ystical. 11
In saying that some things "can be said," it is understood that 
there are things that can be spoken o f  better than others. W ittgenstein  
gives relevance to m etaphysics as being this aspect o f  liv ing  which is 
more d ifficu lt , sometimes im possib le, to talk about. Metaphysics goes  
beyond physics, that is ,  beyond the elucidation o f  phenomena which  
can be seen or reasoned m aterialistically . It deals with the realm o f  
thinking im materiality, thinking the being;
The right method o f  philosophy would be 
this. To say nothing except what can be 
said, i.e. the propositions o f natural 
science , i.e. something that has nothing to 
do with philosophy; and then always, when 
someone e lse  wished to say something  
m etaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he 
had given  no meaning to certain signs in his
propositions. 12
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Here, W ittgenstein enters the realm of the 'unsayable' and 
differentiates things that can be said from those that cannot. But what 
can be made out o f  what can not be said? Before going to the answer, I 
would like to focus attention on one more interesting proposition in 
the Tractatus. Having pointed out all the relativity o f language and 
communication, all the p o ss ib i l it ie s ,  and, sometimes, the lack o f  
p oss ib ilit ies  raised by language, the author questions absolute truth 
itself;
Whatever we see could be other than it is. 
Whatever we can describe at all could be 
other than it is.^^
In this sense, language imposes severe lim itations to reality, so 
diverse and personal that no description can ever be thought of as a 
mirror for it. In other words, language and reality, language and truth
impose lim its on each other, since they are not compatible. Language 
has become the main vehicle  for humanity's communication, for each  
one's reality; and yet, it cannot but distort reality.
Now we report back to the previous questions concerning  
what can be made out of what can not be said. According to 
W ittgenstein , s i len ce  is the answer: "What we cannot speak about we 
must pass over in silence."^^ In order to avoid tautology and useless  
speech it is necessary to 'shut up.' Language goes only so far. Further 
is si lence.
In c lo s in g  this short d iscu ssion  on Wittgenstein's 
propositions on language, it is worth quoting a significant passage o f  
his work, in w hich he makes a comparison between language and 
dressing;
33
So much so, that from the external form o f  
the clothes one cannot infer the form o f  the 
thought they clothe, because the external form 
o f the c lothes is constructed w ith  quite 
another object than to let the form o f  the body 
be recognized.
After having examined some ideas on language by Saussure
—  language as representation o f the world —  and by W ittgenstein —
the gap betw een representation of the world(language) and the word 
i t s e l f  — , we would like to discuss some ideas brought up by George 
Steiner in his book Language and S ilen ce . Steiner also evokes the 
lim itations o f  language and its failure to communicate, but presents 
the power o f  language and its importance to humanity as well. He 
d iscu sses  the role o f  language in modern society  and its crisis ,  
high lightin g  important historical aspects o f  language and literature, 
comm enting on the relations between language and humanity.
The author presents language in the period of Christianity as 
being primordial, as a powerful instrument on which humans depended 
entirely:
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The primacy of the word, o f  that w hich can 
be spoken and communicated in d iscourse, was 
characteristic o f  the Greek and Judaic genius 
and carried over into Christianity. The c lassic  
and the Christian sense o f  the word strive to 
order reality within the governance o f  
language. Literature, philosophy, theology, 
law , the arts o f  history, are endeavours to 
enclose  within the bounds o f  rational discourse  
the sum o f  human experience, its recorded past, 
its present condition and future 
expectations.
In the seventeenth-century, however, areas of knowledge other than the 
hum anities, such as mathematics, start to "recede from the sphere of  
verbal s t a t e m e n t . " T h a t  is to say, these areas begin to formulate 
their own systems o f  communication and verbal language is no longer  
their vehicle  since the knowledge conveyed by them is not easily  
translated into language. The growing of autonomous and peculiar  
codes for natural sc iences fostered the apparition o f a long bridge 
between language and these new codes;
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Where biology turns towards chemistry, and 
biochemistry is at present the high ground 
it tends to relinquish the descriptiv« for 
the enumerative. It abandons the word for
the figure. 1*7
As a result, language loses  its authority and its aura, and begins to be 
seen from a new perspective; confidence on it declines;
This b e l ie f  is no longer universal. 
Confidence in it declines after the age 
o f M ilton. The cause and history o f  that 
decline throw sharp light on the 
circumstances of modern literature and 
language.
Language is no longer the conveyer o f truth, but o f i t se lf  
only, wherein comes the division o f  experience and perception of  
reality into different realms, which are not equivalent.
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The actual facts o f  the case • the space 
continuum o f  relativity, the atomic  
structure o f  all matter, the w ave-particle  
state o f  energy - are no longer access ib le  
through the word. It is no paradox to 
assert that in cardinal respects reality  
now begins outside verbal language.
Steiner poses the dichotomy w ords/fee lings , stating that it is 
possib le  to put into words what one sees , but not what one feels . What 
in fe lt  is anterior to or outside language, And this fact causes  
tremendous resonances on modern Art. As language is no longer at the 
center o f  l ife ,  reality has no equivalence w ith  words anymore. Art may 
not be transposed into language, but into Art itself:
Because the community o f traditional values  
is  splintered, because words them selves have 
been tw isted  and cheapened, because the 
c la ss ic  forms o f statement and metaphor are 
yie ld in g  to complex, transitional modes, the 
art o f  reading, o f true literacy, must be 
reconstituted .20
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M eanwhile, and paradoxically enough, Steiner stresses the 
essen tia lly  verbal character o f  western c iv ilization . Western thought 
articulates i t s e l f  verbally in many sign ificant parts o f our lives:
We take this character for granted. It is 
the root and bark of our experience and we 
can not readily transpose our im ages outside  
it. We live  inside the act o f d i s c o u r s e . 21
The power literature exerts over humanity is o f  boundless  
s ign if ica n ce , as the reader's consc iousness is occupied by great waves  
o f  im pression coming from a great novel or poem. In this aspect, 
literature changes reality, 'literating' humans:
A great poem, a c la ss ic  novel, press in upon 
us; they assa il and occupy the strong places  
of our consciousness. They exercise upon our 
im agination and desires , upon our ambitions 
and most covert dreams, a strange, bruising
m astery.22
And what power does this literacy bring to humanity? What 
does it mean being able to speak or to write? Speech has taken us 
away from the natural world, from the company o f the animals. In
being able to speak, we fictionalize our thoughts, our fee lings, and we 
even come closer to divinity:
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Man's control o f the word has also hammered 
at the door o f gods. More than fire, whose  
power to illumine or to consum e, to spread 
and to draw inward, it so strangely  
resem bles, speech is the core o f  man's 
mutinous relations to the g o d s . 23
Steiner illustrates this power o f  language with practical 
examples drawn out o f  modern history, and points out the destructive  
quality that language possesses  i f  used for negative ends. The German 
language, for him, not only happened to be the language of nazism, but 
it also helped make the war and the holocaust:
N ew  lin gu ists  were at hand to make of the German language a 
p olit ica l weapon more total and effective than any history had 
known, and to degrade the dignity of human speech to the 
level o f  baying w o l v e s . 2 4
Emily D ick inson , as we w il l  see, is likew ise  aware of the 
power o f  language, o f  its use as a weapon. In poem J.8, for example, 
she calls attention to this aspect:
There is a word
Which bears a sword
Can pierce an armed man —
It hurls its barbed syllables  
And is mute again —
But where it fell  
The saved w il l  tell  
On patriotic day.
Some epauletted Brother 
Gave his breath, away.
(...)
Here we see clearly that with her game o f  words -— words/sword, 
armed/barbed —  the poet presents language as a weapon w hich can 
"pierce an armed man." And, in fact, a weapon that can kill . The 
"epauletted Brother" who "gave his breath away" is not only the victim  
o f  a metal sword, but rather o f  the word as a sword, as a dangerous 
sword which can be used to k il l  and be 'mute' again. Here we have the 
danger o f  the words in use, o f  language being able to destroy and fall  
into s ilence , always ready to be spoken again.
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And, then, we confront, once again, the power and void of  
language. The question which arises from Steiner's d iscussion  is 
related to the attitude the writer takes before such an unsolved  
paradox. The title  Language and Silence makes, then, sense, in the 
context o f  D ickinson's poetry: "Beyond the poems, almost s t ronger  
than them, is the fact of renunciation, the chosen s i l e n c e .  "25 
C onscious o f  the immense void present in language, in spite of its 
power, the poet e lects silence  as an answer the lim itations o f  
language, not to say as a refuge for such. This 'retreat' from language  
is h is tor ica lly  recent, given the change of values in relation to 
language.
The poet has become an ambiguous being who, concomitantly, 
plays the role o f  master of language, and escapes from it. As the one 
who creates words, who renews them, and keeps them alive, the poet 
can be compared to god. R ecalling D ickinson's poem J.569, we have a 
hierarchy between poet, sun, summer, and heaven:
I reckon —  when I count at all —
First —  Poets —  Then the Sun —
Then Summer —  Then the Heaven o f God —
And then —  the List is done —
40
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But, looking back —  the First so seems 
To Comprehend the Whole —
The Others look a needless Show -—
So I w r i te  —  Poets — All 
( . . . )
The poet is  the Ood o f  words. It is he who comprehends nature — sun, 
summer —  and even the m ystical —  heaven. He is the first o f the l is t ,  
and the others are even 'needless' when compared to him. But, anyway, 
and probably because he knows the destructive power he has in hands, 
he seeks refuge in silence. As Steiner remarks.
This revaluation o f  silence  —  in the 
epistem ology o f  W ittgenstein , in the
aesthetics o f Weber and Cage, in the poetics of Beckett —  is 
one o f the most original, characteristic acts of the modern 
spirit. The conceit o f  the word unspoken, o f the music  
unheard and therefore is in Keats, a local paradox, a neo- 
Platonic ornament. In much modern poetry silence represents 
the claims o f  the i d e a l . ..26
In the next chapter, we w ill  see how Emily Dickinson writes 
about s ilen ce  as one possib le  solution to the poet involved with  
language and its paradoxes.
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Up to this point, we have seen how scholars view language  
and its paradoxes. We have briefly related their ideas to D ickinson's  
poetry. In this chapter, we w ill  deal exclusive ly  with her poems. In 
many o f  them, we see the conflict between elements o f  power and 
weakness in language, as in the following:
J.1261
A Word dropped careless on a Page 
May stimulate an eye
When folded in perpetual seam 
The Wrinkled Maker lie
Infection in the sentence breeds 
We may inhale Despair  
At distances o f  Centuries 
From the Malaria —
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There are several elements in the poem which imply power —  
"perpetual seam", "Infection", "distances o f  Centuries", "Malaria*. The 
words together make up a story o f  long lasting power and influence. 
The influence o f the "wrinkld Maker" over the "eye". That is to say, 
the reader being influenced by the original author; the influence o f  
artistic creation. The wordly effect, which is "folded in perpetual 
seam," stays in the 'seam' for centuries. The reader is even able to 
inhale the despair from 'malaria.' This is a poem about the power and 
independence o f  language, about the long distance in time and space 
transposed by the text.
A lso , two important elem ents here are not in opposition but 
rather in complicity: the 'eye' and the 'wrinkled maker.' The word 
carelessly  dropped by the 'Maker' —  the poet —  stimulates the 'eye' —
the reader. And there is the link between them —  the infection. What 
would Malaria stand for? Would literature be like an infection 'locked' 
in books? If so, the sim ple reading o f any poem would 'spread' it. The 
expression 'perpetual seam' is quite strong and suggests the 
independent life  o f  the word. Here we recall another poem (J.12 12), 
w hose theme is  similar:
A word is dead 
When it is said.
Some say.
I say it just 
B egins to live  
That day.
In this poem, D ickinson states her b e l ie f  in the power o f  the 
s in g le  word is stated. Once a word is used, it "Begins to live." This is 
a very dickinsonian thought - v iew ing the word as a live and powerful 
entity. Some o f  her poems even look like l is ts  o f  words, as i f  in an 




Pink —  small — and punctual 
Aromatic —  low —
Covert —  in April —
Candid —  in May —
Dear to the M oss —
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Known to the Knoll - 
Next to the Robin  
In every human soul  
Bold litt le  Beauty  
Bedecked with thee  
Nature forswears 
Antiquity —
Each word here seems to assum e a definite and separate role, 
a role that is stressed by punctuation. The subject o f the poem —  
Nature —  comes only at the end. Firstly we have all the words and 
expressions that 'qualify' it —  each quality, each description w ith a 
freight o f  its own, as i f  in a game o f  words, describing a unique  
element with m ultiple characteristics, m ultiple words. And each o f
these words seems to be lying alone on the page bringing forth its 
own l ife ,  as Roland HagenbOchle remarks:
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Emily Dickinson, too, was concerned with the 
renewal of language, but for her the 
em phasis lay always on the word as 
su ch .( . . .)
How important the single word is to her may 
be gathered from her strategy o f  
foregrounding words through ita lic s ,  capital 
letters, and the hyphen. ^
John S. Mann also calls  attention to this aspect in her poetry;
Single  words can 'glow' in her sen sib ility  
with a royal, a created life  o f  their own, 
once they have been 'named* by the poet. 
N othing seemed finally more important to 
her than this released power o f  the s in g le  
w ord.2
In another poem, she recognizes the powerful impact o f  words 
on human life:
J.1409  
Could mortal lip divine  
The undeveloped Freight 
O f a delivered syllable  
'Twould crumble with the weight.
There are several su ggestive  figures in the poem, indicating the speaker's 
lack o f  consciousness o f the power o f  language. The very first verse, 
"could mortal lip  divine", takes for granted the human unconsciousness  
in  relation to something. The next two lines present a playful opposition  
o f  the figures "undeveloped Freight/delivered syllable." The syllab le,  
the word being delivered, necessarily  leads to the development o f  the 
"Freight." What would Freight here mean? The value o f the syllable? Or 
the meaning o f  it? In the last line, the words "crumble" and "weight" 
suggest the powerfulness o f  this "Freight." Speakers, therefore, are not 
conscious o f  the impact that the spoken word has on reality. In the words 
o f  W ittgenstein ,
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Man p o ssesses  the Capacity o f  constructing  
languages, in which every sense can be 
expressed, without having an idea how and what 
means —  just as one speaks without knowing how  
the single sounds are p r o d u c e d .^
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Still concerned with the powerful aspect o f language, 
D ickinson makes a meaningful comparison between a frigate and a 
book;
J.1263
There is no Frigate like a Book 
To take us Lands away 
Nor any Coursers like a Page 
Of prancing Poetry —
This traverse may the poorest take 
Without oppress o f  Toll —
How frugal is the Chariot 
That bears the Human soul.
Book, page —  language —  have here the iam e ehafacteristic movement 
of  a frigate, o f  a courser. The word poetry even receives the adjective, 
prancing, which gives it movement, life . Literature has the power to 
take readers on a trip; nonetheless, we are tempted to say that the poet 
is writing about an interior trip, one that does not imply the "oppress
of  Toll," and that "bears the Human Soul." But though interior, this  
trip is no less important, since it "take(s) us Lands away."
The same force through distance, through "Lands away" 
presented in the poem above is also shown in relation to time. We 
have already seen this aspect in the beginning o f  this chapter, when, 
in the poem J .1261, the poet mentions "distances o f  Centuries." In the 
fo llow in g  poem, D ickinson g ives the word an idea o f  perpetual youth, 
professing her faith in the eternal eloquence o f language:
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J.1467  
A litt le  overflowing word 
That any, hearing, had inferred 
For Ardor or for Tears,
Though Generations pass away. 
Traditions ripen and decay.
As eloquent appears —
In the in itia l verse, we have the opposing qualities  
l it t le /overflow in g  o f  the word. The second adjective is  quite 
su ggestive  in terms o f  omnipresence —  perhaps not a physical
presence, but a temporal one. A lso , the terms Ardor and Tears carry 
their share o f  importance in that they bring about opposing fee lin gs  of  
happiness and sadness which can be strongly recalled by words. In the 
verses "Though Generations pass away,/ Traditions ripen and decay," 
the poet establishes the value of the word as being above that o f  time 
and tradition. Although it is through words that humanity transmit its 
values, know ledge, u sages , thoughts, and though these aspects change  
from generation to generation, the word i t se lf  does not change; it stays 
eloquent. Thoughts and ideas grow old; words remain im pervious to 
time.
In considering the power o f  words, D ickinson is also  
concerned with the ones who work them. In some poems, she writes 
directly  about poets and their craft, as in J.448:
This was a Poet —  It is that 
D ist i l ls  amazing sense  
From ordinary M eanings —  -
And Attar so immense
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From the familiar species  
That perished by the Door
We wonder it was not Ourselves  
Arrested it —  before —
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Of Pictures, the D isc loser  - 
The Poet —  it is He —  
Entitles Us —  by Contrast 
To cea se le ss  Poverty —
In the first stanza, the poet's craft is already defined, the 
d is ti l la tio n  o f  "amazing sense/From ordinary M eanings” — that is ,  
renewing language, i f  not creating it. The poet is the one who makes 
fam iliarity unfamiliar and, m eanwhile , makes the reader also a part in 
the creative act —  "We wonder it was not Ourselves/Arrested it —  
b e f o r e — ." N evertheless , in the third stanza, the poet's superiority is  
evident when we —  the readers —  are entitled to "poverty." Certainly, 
his superiority is related to his power of creating and renewing words, 
of  d isc lo s in g  "Pictures — " and this image may w e ll  mean that the poet 
is able to d isc lo se , to describe reality with more Art. The last verses  
restate the tim eless Fortune which the poet p ossesses  — the ability  to 
deal w ith  words.
A lso , in poem J.569, D ickinson endows the poet with  
superior ab il it ie s ,  d isp laying him among several other elements;
I reckon —  when I count at all —
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First —  Poets —  Then the Sun —
Then Summer —  Then the Heaven of God 
And then —  the List is done —
But, looking back —  the First so seems 
To Comprehend the Whole —
The Others look a needless Show —
So I write  —  Poets —  A ll —
Their Summer —  ^ lasts a Solid Year - 
They can afford a Sun 
The East—  would deem extravagant 
And i f  the Further Heaven —
Be Beautifu l as they prepare 
For Those who worship Them 
It is too d ifficu lt a Grace —
To justify the Dream —
The poet comes before Sun, Summer and heaven. Why is he 
the first? The answer comes in the second stanza: the poet is able to 
"comprehend" the other elements. He is inside Nature, but, meanwhile, 
he p o sse sses  it, in that he can understand it. More than this, the Poet 
"afford[s]" nature, creating it with words. The "Heaven" they [the 
Poets] "prepare" —  that is , the fictional heaven they create with words
—  Poetry —  is a "Grace." The poet, in this poem, is compared to God. 
He is superior, he has worshipers, and he also prepares a heaven. In 
the last stanza, however, we have a hint ["It is too difficult a Grace 
— ”] that his divinity is  not easily  understood, the "Dream" is not 
always justif ied . Is the "Dream" of language more d ifficu lt to be 
attained? Why is the Poet’s craft "too d ifficu lt a G r a c e — / To justify  
the Dream — "? These questions lead us to another aspect o f  
D ickinson's considerations on language.
Up to this point we have seen how Dickinbson acknowledges  
the su ggestive  power language p o sse sses .  In most o f the poems 
d iscu ssed , she declares language's surviving power through time and 
its strong impact on human relationships. We have also  seen the 
importance o f  the poet as the one who deals with such an important
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artifice. Although in these poems Dickinson shows how powerful 
language can be, in none of them she mentions real communication of  
fee lings and ideas. Our next step w ill  be the reading o f  some poems in 




I found the words to every thought 
I ever had —  but One —
And that —  defies me —
As a Hand did try to chalk the Sun
To Races —  nurtured in the Dark 
How would your own — begin? 
Can Blaze be shown in Cochineal 
Or Noon —  in Mazarin?
The poem above is about the difficulty o f  putting thoughts  
into words. The image used, the "Hand [that tries] to chalk the Sun" 
im plies huge difficulty, or rather, im possibility. The second stanza  
presents two very improbable ideas: Blaze — Cochineal / Noon —
Mazarin. There are, indeed, words for many thoughts, but this 
possib ility  goes only to one point. There is "One" which "defies" the 
poet. What kind o f  thought would that be? Here we must also  recall 
poem J.1668:
If  I could tell how glad I was
I should not be so glad —
But when I cannot make the Force,
Nor mould it into Word,
I know it is a sign  
That new Dilemma be 
From mathematics further off  
Than from Eternity.
The first two lines o f  the poem already come up with the 
difficu lty  o f  communicating gladness. She names this d ifficu lty  after 
"Dilemma," which is more related to "Eternity" than to "mathematics." 
Here we have two key elements in opposition, which are essen tia l for 
the reading o f the poem. "Mathematics" would surely stand for 
precision, which is a quality we do not usually  connect to fee lin gs ,  
such as gladness. Conversely, "Eternity" can bring to the reader's mind
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a more generalized idea, absolutely unprecise. Since Dickinson cannot
•ft
define "how glad" she fee ls , she does not go on trying to define, but 
works with oppositions which in a way g ives us a vague idea o f  her 
fee lings. Her gladness would be much more related to "Eternity" than 
precise.
Roland Hagenbfichle has accurately described Dickinson's  
strategy in producing definition:
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Knowledge for her cannot be fixed in terms o f some definite  
truth. This would be an inadm issible act o f  hypostatization or 
reification , especia lly  where relig ious concepts are concerned  
with their intim ations of an objective supernatural world. 
Therefore, her definitions are dynamic and open-ended  
explorations rather than assertions. In contrast to the Bible's  
apodictic "Center," Dickinson's poetry —  to use her own term
—  is a poetry o f "Circumference" (L. 950); it pursues the
movement o f  the spirit in the very process o f knowing, a 
process which is inseparably bound up to the movement o f  
language.“^
As an exam ple o f  Dickinson's "Circumference" in poetry, 
poem J.300 presents an attempt to define "morning:"
"Morning" —  means "Milking" —  to the Farmer 
Dawn —  to the Teneriffe —
Dice —  to the Maid —
Morning means just Risk — to the Lover 
Just revelation — to the Beloved —
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Epicures —  date a Breakfast — by it 
Brides —  an Apocalypse —
Worlds —  a Flood —
Faint-going Lives —  Their Lapse from Sighing  
Faith —  The Experiment o f  Our Lord —
< Starting with the single word, the poet builds a whole universe of  
m eanings, bringing to the poem relations between "Morning" and other 
words. Probably, she tries to show the nonrigidity o f meaning that 
words have; rather, they have relative meanings according to relative  
situations. As HagenbOchle points out, the poet works w ith  "the 
movement o f  l a n g u a g e , m o v i n g  from point to point, from word to 
word, trying to 'overmean' the word "Morning." The very structure o f  
the poem suggests  the infinitude o f  meanings "Morning" can have. In 
the first verse, she presents the word to be defined. In each o f  the 
other verses, she presents one different meanings for one different
situation. The list could continue for much longer, given the infinite  
quality o f  metaphors. As W ittgenstein would put it.
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What the axiom of infinity  is intended to say would express 
i tse lf  in language through the existence o f  in fin itely  many 
names with different meanings.^
Of course, these "infinitely many names" mentioned by the 
philosopher can be put in opposition through metaphors, so that the 
p o ss ib i l it ie s  o f  meanings would be infinite. Preciseness in defin ition  
becomes a complex question, a lso  mentioned by Dickinson;
J 988
The D efin ition  o f  Beauty is 
That D efin ition  is none —
Of Heaven, easing Analysis,
Since Heaven and He are one.
The expressions "Definition o f  Beauty / D efin ition  is none" oppose  
each other almost with mathematical precision. The word "none" 
reduces the two verses to almost nothing, and gives the poem an idea 
o f  u se le ssn ess .  Yet the other two lines rescue the act o f defining by
bringing to the scenery a metaphor — "Heaven and He," — That does 
not solve, but postpones the problem.
The im possib ility  o f naming certain feelings is , thus, a great 
poetical concern for Dickinson:
J.1382
In many and reportless places 
We feel the Joy —:
R eportless, a lso , but sincere as Nature 
Or Deity —
It com es, without a consternation —
D isso lv es  —  the same —
But leaves a sumptuous Destitution —
Without a Name —
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Profaned it by a search -— we cannot 
It has no home —
Nor we who having once inhaled it is 
Thereafter roam.
Here she tries to report the "reportless" — reportless place» — 
reportless joy. And even comparing this fee ling  to Nature or God, she 
cannot name it. What would, then, "sumptuous Destitution" refer to? 
The emptiness caused by such a joy or the im possib ility  o f naming it? 
John S. Mann, in "Emily D ickinson, Emerson, and the Poet as Namcr," 
d iscu sses  this point:
63
For Emily D ick inson  found in naming an activity that could 
release the m agica l, Adamic power o f  language, allow ing her 
to recreate her world, and somehow possess its disparate 
materials. Nam ing could help fu lfill  her passion to know.^
Indeed, in poem J. 1452, D ickinson makes an interesting  
consideration about words and thoughts:
Your thoughts don't have words every day 
They come a s in g le  time ^
Like signal esoteric  sips 
Of the communion Wine 
Which w hile  you taste so native seems 
So easy to be
You cannot comprehend its price
Nor its infrequency
The problem atics o f knowing/nam ing is clear. The first verse already 
states the separation between thoughts and words. What fo llow s is an 
explanation o f  how d ifficu lt it is to comprehend, or even, apprehend 
thoughts or knowledge. The poet even m ystifies the question by calling  
up a comparison with the "communion wine," which can taste so 
native, but which like  thoughts them selves, is incomprehensible. The 
term 'words', as seen, is mentioned only once. What the rest o f the 
poem is  about is the complexity o f  understanding human thoughts. 
Would this distance between words and thoughts make the latter more 
incom prehensible? Would thoughts 'which have words' be easier to 
understand? Or would they rarely have words? What sort o f thoughts 
can really be uttered? Two passages by W ittgenstein lead us in the 
way o f  an answer:
64
The correct method in philosophy would really be the 
fo llow ing: to say nothing except what can be said , i .e .,  
propositions o f natural science —  i.e. something that has 
nothing to do with philosophy —  and then, whenever someone  
e lse  wanted to say something m etaphysical, to demonstrate to 
him that he had failed to g ive a meaning to certain signs in 
his propositions.
Whereof we cannot speak, thereof one must be 
silent.^
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Silence, would, therefore, be an alternative for the 
unutterable thoughts. According to W ittgenstein, the only alternative. 
In many o f Dickinson's poem s, we can also see the apology of silence.  
The poet states that s ilen ce  is a superior language, sometimes more 
powerful to communicate than language itself:
J.989
Gratitude - is not the mention  
O f a Tenderness,
But its st i l l  appreciation  
Out o f  a Plumb o f  Speech.
When the Sea return no Answer  
By the Line and Lead 
Proves it there's no Sea, or rather 
A remoter bed?
The very first word o f  the poem —  "Gratitude" — represents a 
fee ling  and it is soon dissociated  from speaking —  "is not the 
mention." The "still appreciation" would be a much more adequate
means to express gratitude than the "mention." In the second stanza, 
she m entions the sea p layfu lly  as an element o f great power, but also
0
'answerless.' The lack o f  an answer does not render the sea weaker, 
but "remoter."
In the next poem, she also points out the superiority o f  
s i len ce , or even o f  other means o f  communication over language:
J.97
The rainbow never te lls  me 
That gust and storm are by.
Yet is  she more convincing  
Than Philosophy.
(•■)
In many other poem s, the poet shows the importance o f  
s ilen ce  as well:
J.1004
There is no S ilence  in the Earth —  so silent  
As that endured
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Which uttered, would discourage Nature 
And haunt the World.
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J.1251  
Silence  is all we dread. 
There's Ransom in a Voice  
But S ilence  is Infinity. 
H im self  have not a face.
D ickinson's strong respect for s ilence  parallels her mistrust  
o f  the power o f  communication presented by language. In the 
beginning o f  this chapter, we read some poems in which she praises  
the power o f  ind ividual words. The contradiction shows i t s e l f  when  
she declares her awareness in relation to things we can 'not' utter and 
her worship for silence . If, however, we take words and 
communication as two separate and definite th ings, the contradiction  
is made less strong. D ickinson never takes for granted that language  
could communicate fee lin gs , abstractions. According to Sharon 
Cameron, the poet was conscious o f  the lack language represents.
Outside o f  temporality, or outside o f  the realm in which time  
and space diverge from each other, consciousness is  a noon
BO dazzling that its rays make of the mirror a mere glare. So 
language sings light's praises by asserting its own 
inadequacy. So the thing itse lf, without representation, 
negates the world of imperfection from which representation  
arises. So language mourns the space it must faithfully  
record.^
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Aware o f  language's lim itations, D ickinson  acknowledged the 
importance o f  s ilen ce . But in order to express silence's importance, 
she, paradoxically enough, uses words. Why?
J.1681
Speech is one symptom o f  Affection  
And Silence one —
The perfectest communication  
Is heard of none —
Exists and its indorsement 
Is had within —
Behold, said the Apostle, 
Yet had not seen!
Naturally this is a poem about the superiority of s ilence  as a 
form o f  communication. The real communication is  somewhat interior
—  "heard of none/had within — ." But the first line o f  the poem  
mentions "Affection." Although not being effective , language is , in a 
sense, important to humans affectively:
J.1700
To te ll  the Beauty would decrease  
To state the Spell demean —
There is a sy llab le-less  Sea 
O f w hich it is the sign  —
My w il l  endeavors for its word 
And fa ils ,  but entertains 
A Rapture as o f  Legacies —
O f introspective Mines —
The lack o f faith in language as a means o f  communicating is promptly  
stated. At once, the verbs 'tell' and 'state' are d isqualified , or, at least
—  i f  this term here sounds too strong —  not believed. Telling the 
Beauty decreases it. A esthetics has much more to do with fee lin g ,  
seeing, perceiving th ings. Would aesthetic appreciation have ainything
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to do with te l l in g  how beautiful one object is? And also , stating  
"demean(s)" the Spell; that is to say, utters what can only be felt. The 
word that attempts to utter reality is just a (weak) reflection o f it. 
"There is a sy llab le  —  less Sea/O f which it is the sign — ." The word 
Sea here im plies the immensity and complexity o f  what is  reflected in 
the "sign,” in language, in the arbitrary code theorized by Saussure.




Tell a ll the Truth but te ll  it slant 
Success in Circuit lies  
Too bright for our infirm Delight 
The Truth's superb surprise
As Lightning to the Children eased 
With explanation kind 
The Truth must dazzle gradually  
Or every man be blind —
The poet states her fear in relation to 'telling the truth,' as it may not 
be directly told. Telling "slant" is her suggestion  , since, otherwise, 
truth can 'blind'. Would her suggestion for indirectness have any 
connection w ith her fear o f  the void in communication in language? In 
other words, would truth be distorted by language's lack o f  preciseness  
and ineffic iency?
At any account, referring back to poem J .1700, we perceive  
that D ickinson's unfaithfulness to 'telling' and 'stating' is clear. And 
she ia even conscious o f  her failure; "My w ill  endeavors for its word / 
And fa ils ..."  Hagenbtlchle says that her poems are often records o f  
failure and [that] she works in self-negation ."!^  As a poet, she is 
aware that her 'will' fa ils . But the fo llow ing  words make the poem  
problematic; "And fa ils ,  but entertains." This verse could sound like; 
'I know language is a failure, but 1 like to write, to speak, to hear the 
sound o f  words, to have the illu sion  o f  real communication. After a ll,  
is it not this fee lin g  o f  communicating that keeps us together?' At this  
point, it m ight be interesting to recall the use of the term "affection" 
in poem J. 1681. Would language not be one affectionate link between  
j " '
us?
S til l  focusing on this affectionate link, we return now to a 




A Word made F lesh is seldom  
And tremblingly partook 
Nor then perhaps reported 
But have I not mistook  
Each one o f us has tasted  
With ecstasies  o f  stealth  
The very food debated 
To our specific  strength —
A Word that breathes distinctly  
Has not the power to die  
Cohesive as the spirit 
It may expire i f  He —
"Made F lesh and dwelt among us' 
Could condescension be 
Like this consent o f  Language  
This loved Philology.
In the first stanza, there is the "Word" which is "made 
Flesh." Would that be the act of speaking? The word in its material 
realization when delivered through human's lips? But, i f  so, the act of  
speaking is unique and almost always solitary — "seldom / And 
tremblingly partook." A lso , it is not "reported." Would that stand for 
the idea o f  the act o f speaking being individual and im possib le  to 
explain , to report? That means to say that words are not able to report 
them selves, or to report how they happen to be. In the fo llow ing  verses  
of  the stanza, however, we see the idea o f  words in use, helping  
humans to fu lf i ll  a need. Words become, then, "The very food debated” 
which satiates our "strength." And this is a fact that briiags "ecstasies  
of  stealth," that is ,  the act o f speaking fa n  fail in not being able to be 
"Partook" but fu lf i l ls  a human need for strength, and, indeed, brings 
"ecstasies o f  stea lth .” And here again we have the idea o f  the act o f  
speaking being individual and even secret, in the word 'stealth.' 
Speaking would bring, thus, some inner satisfaction . Its impact in  the 
outer world can be fa lse , but it fu lf i lls  inner needs.
In the next stanza, the immortality o f  the word is asserted  
and the word is even compared to Jesus. Philo logy is view ed rather in 
a relig iou s sense, in which the word is the immortal god. Like a god.
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the word is viewed as something cannot understand, but on which we 
have some faith.
Poem J.1587 a lso  compares language and religion;
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He ate and drank the precious Words 
His Spirit grew robust —
He knew no more that he was poor.
Nor that his Frame was Dust —
He danced along the dingy Days 
And this Bequest o f  Wings 
Was b u t^  Book —  What Liberty 
A loosened spirit brings —
Words are v iew ed as food and drink —  the bread and the wine that fed  
not only the body, but rather the spirit. As in the aforementioned poem  
(J .1651) words fu lf i l l  an inner hunger, and in the poem above, even  
more obviously , they make the spirit "robust." "He," be it Jesus or 
simply any character, is made strong through words, and in a way, is 
perpetuated through them. This we can infer from the image "frame 
was Dust-." After having drunk and eaten the words, "He" knows no
more that "his frame was Dust." The "frame," his im age, w il l  not 
vanish like "Dust" anymore, or at least, the words made him believe  
so. Words made him forget his poverty and mortality.
The second stanza brings, thus, the statement that his joy was 
caused by words. The "Book" is compared to a "Bequest o f  Wings" that 
loosens the spirit. The power o f  words, then, is like the power o f  God 
who also gave Jesus re lie f  and freedom. The poem brings this power 
into a human lev e l ,  though. Words are earthly, they are made up by 
humans and can affect humans by g iv ing them freedom and hope.
1 would like  here to reread the poem with which we have 
started our d iscu ssion  in this chapter;
J.1261
A Word dropped careless on a Page 
May stimulate an eye 
When folded in perpetual seam  
The Wrinkled Maker lie
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Infection in the sentence breeds 
We may inhale Despair  
At distances o f  Centuries
From the Malaria -
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At a first glance, we may have taken this poem as an apology  
for the word as a t im eless and powerful element. We viewed the term 
"infection" as a sign for the word ability  for spreading i t se lf  through 
centuries. If now we connect infection  to  despair, infection can 
probably be view ed as a desire for communication, the affectionate  
role that language has in our relations causing despair for its own  
void. But humanity does not easily  g ive  it  up. The "infection" can last 
for centuries. Language, indeed, is a means o f  keeping us connected to 
past and future. Our knowledge and history, although so many times 
slantly or even 'badly' told , came to us through language.
Would language not be one o f  the few things humans can 
offer each other?
J.26
It's a ll  I have to bring today 
This, and my heart beside —
This, and my heart, and all the fields  
And all the meadows wide —
Be sure you count —  should I forget
Some one the sum could tell
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This, and my heart, and all the Bees  
Which in the Clover dwell.
By using words the poet brings us language and her heart, 
language and affection.
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It's a ll I have to bring today —
This, and my heart beside —
This, and my heart, and all the fields  
And all the meadows wide —
Be sure you count —  Should I forget 
Some one the sum could tell —
This, and my heart, and all thé Bees 
Which in the Clover dwell.
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The poem is all the poet has "to bring today." Literature, 
language is what the poet can offer us "This, and my heart beside  
— " Language and heart, language and 'affection,' language and 
entertainment, poetry.
During this dissertation we have asked some questions in 
relation to language and literature, in relation to D ickinson's "This, 
and my heart beside". We have tried to h igh light several aspects o f  
language and literature. Why us^ language, why be a poet, why try to 
utter, things that are so difficult to utter? In the former chapter we  
have seen some hints which led us to some conclusions towards 
D ickinson's complex ideas on human language and communication, 
and, consequently, on human relationships. In some o f  them, 
D ick inson  shows language as ineffic ient; in others, as powerful. In 
others s t i l l ,  she professes her faith on words as "affection." In this 
chapter we w ill  review some of the main points that were brought up 
and estab lish  a relationship between them.
As we have seen in the introduction, through some important 
critical texts, many aspects o f her poetry became clearer to me. In 
other cases , the points h ighlighted served as a bridge to other 
important aspects, such as the role o f  the poet as the language-maker
—  the god o f the words, language as re lig ion , and language aa a 
powerful weapon. These aspects, naturally, are all implicated in the 
paradox involving language ineffic iency and power, a paradox that this 
dissertation  tried to analyse in readings o f  sp ec if ic  poems.
Many critics have dealt with the theme of language in 
D ick in so n ’s poetry, through different approaches. Some o f  them  
pointed out the power of words for her; some highlighted their 
ineffic iency . Some worked with both aspects. After having read her 
poetry extensively , and after having read some o f  that criticism , I 
decided to pursue the question o f  the possib le  reason for using  
language, even though it  is ineffic ient. I ain conscious, though, that 
this aspect has been explored by other critics. What I wanted, 
however, was to present my reading o f  this aspect in such an 
intriguing poetry.
Having, then, introduced my thematic concern, I proceeded to 
make some considerations on language as a topic. I made some 
comments on texts by W ittgenstein, Saussure and George Steiner, the 
three o f  them being quite different in their approaches. Saussure has 
helped me understand better the idea o f  language as a system, the 
physical characteristics of words and the making of language. A lso , he 
makes clear the arbitrary character presented by words. W ittgenstein,
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in turn, a lso  works with the arbitrariness o f  language, but he stresses  
the inadequacy o f  language in relation to metaphysics and m ystical  
experiences. Like Dickinson, he a lso  sees silence  as an alternative. 
F inally , George Steiner directs his d iscussion  to language in a 
historical and politica l sense. He summarizes important aspects  
relating to language and life , and shows us the distance between truth 
and words, reality and language. He a lso  brings the poet as a s ilence  
chooser. In general, these texts helped me have a better idea o f  
lianguage as a means o f human comm unication or, som etim es, o f  non­
comm unication.
After having discussed these theoretical texts on language, I 
went back to Dickinson's poems and I read some o f  them in their 
relation to language. I pointed to interesting aspects in relation to 
words in her poetry. Like Saussure, W ittgenstein , and Steiner, 
D ick inson  is  conscious of language's inadequacy and arbitrariness:
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The sign ifier  actually has no natural 
connection with the sign ified . ^
That which mirrors itse lf  in language,  
language cannot represent.2
It is no paradox to assert that in cardinal 




To tell  the Beauty would decrease  
To state the Spell demean —
There is a sy llab le-less  Sea 
O f which it is the sign  is —
(•••)
As a poet, though, she st il l  uses language to express its own  
inadequacy, and even to express s ilence  as an alternative.
My hypothesis, in the beginning o f  this work, was. that 
language in Dickinson's poetry, although ineffic ien t and inferior to 
s i len ce , is very important to human relationships. Reading her poetry 
was not an easy task, due to the idiosyncrasy o f  her style, but in some  
o f  my readings, I was able to perceive that D ickinson  view s language  
and words are important for us in terms o f  "affection," or because it 
•^entertains," although it often "fails."
In D ickinson, the idea o f  language as artificial and fake 
becomes clear, but it is s t i l l  a joy;
J.1639
A Letter is a joy o f  Earth 
It is denied the Oods —
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Language for her is a human link, a human attempt to come together. 
Perhaps it derives this fake, fictional character from human nature 
i tse lf .  Perhaps it is a reflection  o f  ourselves, and like us, cannot be 
ea s ily  understood.
In c los in g  this chapter, and my dissertation, I would like to 
say how  intrigued I became by Emily D ickinson's work. The originality  
o f her poetry fascinated me from the beginning. And I am sure many 
other subjects and themes may be analysed and pursued not only in 
her poetry, but a lso  in her letters.
As an open end for my d iscu ssion , I would like to quote 
another one o f  D ickinson's poems in which she states her b e l ie f  that 
literature, her "letter to the World," w ill  keep her in contact with other 
people , even though only through words;
J.441
This is my letter to the World
That never wrote to Me —
The simple News that Nature told 
With tender Majesty
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Her M essage is  committed  
To Hands I cannot see —
For love o f  Her —  Sweet —  countrymen 
Judge tenderly —  o f  Me
86
NOTES - CHAPTER IV
1 - Ferdinand de Saussure, "Course in General Linguistics,"  
Contemporary Literary Criticism , eds. Robert C. Davis and Ronald  
Schleifer (New York: Longman, 1989) 160.
2 - Ludwig W ittgenstein. Tratactus L ogico  Philosophicus. 
London; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, 79.
5 - George Steiner. Language and S ilen ce . London: Penguin  
B ooks, 1969. 37.
87
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A iken, Conrad. "Emily Dickinson." Emily Dickinson: A Collection o f  
Critical E ssays . Ed. Richard B. Sew all. N ew  Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1963.
Anderson, Charles. Emily Dickinson's Poetry: Stairway of Surprise.
N ew York; Holt, Rinehart and W inston, 1960.
Arndt, Murray D. "Emily D ickinson and the Limits of Language."
D ickinson  Studies. 57(1986): 19-27.
Budick , E. M iller. Emily Dickinson and the Life o f Language - A 
Study in Symbolic P oetics . Baton Rouge; Louisiana State UP, 
1985.
Cameron, Sharon. Lyric Time • D ickinson and the Limits o f Genre. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1979.
D avis , Dick. "Missing the Meaning." Times Literary Supplem ent. 
17(1986); 58-59.
D ick ie , Margaret. "Dickinson’s D iscontinuous Lyric Self." American  
Literature. 60(1988): 537-544.
Di Giuseppe, Rita. "The Maiden and the Muse; Dickinson's Trope o f  
P oetic  Creation." Quaderni di Lingue e Literature. 12(1987); 39- 
56.
Eberwein, Jane D. "Dickinson's Nobody and U lysses' Noman; 'Then 
there's a pair o f  us?'" D ickinson S tu d ies . 46(1983); 9-14.
Gelpi, Albert. "Emily D ickinson's Word: Presence as Absence, 
A bsence as presence." American Poetry. 4 (1987); 41-50.
Gilbert, Sandra and Gubar, Susan. The Madwoman in the Attic: The 
Woman writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Im agination. 
N ew  Haven; Yale UP, 1984.
Gross, John. "Tell A ll  the Truth but - " B all State University Forum. 
10(1969): 71-77.
H agenbachle, Roland. "Emily D ickinson's A esthetics o f  Process." 
Poetry and Epistemology; Turning Points in the History o f  Poetic  
K now ledge . Ed. Roland Hagenbtlchle and Laura Skandera. 
Regensburg; Pustet, 1986.
88
.....................- ............ . "Sign and Process, the Concept of Language in
Emerson and Dickinson." Emerson Society Quarterly. 25(1979):  
137-155.
Harris, Roy. Reading Saussure. London: Ducworth, 1987.
Johnson, Greg. "Emily Dickinson: Perception and the Poet's Quest."
R enassence . 35(1982V: 2-15.
Johnson, Thomas H .(ed.) The Complete Poems o f  Emily D ick in so n . 
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960.
..................... "The Poet and the Muse: Poetry as Art." Emily
Dickinson: A Collection of Critical E ssay s . Ed. Richard B. 
Sew all. N ew  Jersey: Prentice H all, 1963.
Kimpel, Ben. Emily D ickinson as Philosopher. New York: The Edwin  
M ellen  Press, 1981.
Leinfellner, Werner. "The Development o f  Transcendentalism - Kant, 
Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein." W ittgenstein- Aesthetics and 
Transcedental Philosophy. Ed. Kjell S. Johannessesn & Tore 
Nordenstam. Vienna; Hdlder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1981.
Leonard, James. "Dickinson's Poems o f  definition." Dickinson S tu d ies . 
91(1981): 18-25.
Loving, Jerome. Emily Dickinson: The Poet on the Second Story. N ew  
York: Cambridge UP, 1986.
89
Lucas, Dolores D. Emily Dickinson and R idd le . Illinois; Northern 
I ll in o is  UP, 1969.
Mann. John S."Emily D ickinson, Emerson, and the Poet as Namer." 
N ew  England Quarterly. 51(1978); 467-488.
Marcus, Mordecai. Emily Dickinson: Selected P oem s-N otes. Lincoln:
“ C l i f f  N otes, 1982.
M atthews, Pamela R. "Talking of Hallowed Things: The Importance of  
Silence  in Em ily Dickinson's Poetry." Dickinson S tu d ies . 
47(198 3 ):  14-21.
M iller , Christine. "'A Letter is a Joy o f  Earth:' Dickinson's  
Com munication w ith  the world." Legacy. 3(1986); 29-39.
M orey, Frederick L. "The Esthetics of Emily Dickinson." D ickinson  
S tu d ies . 43 (1982):  1-18.
O ates, Joyce C. "Soul at the White Heat: The Romance o f  Emily  
D ickinson's Poetry." Critical Inquiry. 13(1987): 806-824.
O lsen , T ill ie . "Silences: When Writers don't Write." Images of Women 
in  Fiction: Fem inist P erspectiyes. Ed. Susan K. Cornillon. Ohio: 
B ow ling  Green U niversity  Popular Press, 1983.
Pearce, Roy H. The Continuity o f American Poetry. New Jersey: 
Princenton UP, 1961.
90
Poliak, Vivian R. "Emily D ickinson Literary Allusions." Easays in 
Literature. 1(1984); 54-68.
........................... . "Thirst and Starvation in Emily Dickinson's Poetry."
American Literature. 51(1979); 33-49.
Porter, David. "Emily Dickinson : The Poetics o f Doubt." Emerson  
Society  Quarterly. 60(1970): 86-93.
........................ "The Crucial Experience in Em ily Dickinson's Poetry."
Emerson Society Quarterly. 77(1974): 280-290 .
R ogers, B. J. "The Truth Told Slant: Emily Dickinson's Poetic Mode."
Texas Studies in Literature and Language. 14(1972): 329-336.  
Saussure, Ferdinand de. "Course in General Linguistics". 
Contemporary Literary C ritic ism . Eds. Robert C. D avis and 
Ronald Schleifer. New York: Longman, 1989.
St. Armand, Barton L. "Emily D ickinson's American Grotesque; The 
Poet as Folk Artist." Topic. 3 1 f l9 7 7 V  3-19.
Steiner, George. Language and S ilen ce . London; Penguin Books, 1969. 
Tate, A llen . "Emily Dickinson." Emily Dickinson; A Collection  o f  
Critical E ssays . Ed. Richard B. Sew all. New Jersey: Prentice  
H all, 1963.
91
Thackrey, Donald E. "The Communication of the Words." Emily 
Dickinson: A Collection of Critical E ssays . Ed. Richard B. 
Sew all. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963.
Waggoner, Hyatt H. American Poets : From the Puritans to the Present.
Boston: Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1968.
Wilner, Eleanor. "The Poetics o f  Emily D ick in son ." Journal o f English  
Literary H istory. 38(1971): 126-154.
Winter, Yvor. "Emily D ickinson and the Limits o f  Judgement." Emily  
Dickinson: A Collection o f  Critical E ssays . Ed. Richard B. 
Sew all. N ew  Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963.
W ittgenstein , Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-P hilosophicus. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951.
Woodress, James. "Emily Dickinson." Fifteen American Authors 
before 1900 * B ibliographical Essays on Research and C ritic ism . 
Ed. Garl N. Harbert and Robert A. Rees. Madison: The University  
o f  W isconsin  Press, 1984.
92
